

Message Text

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EXDIS USSALTTWO

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TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 3, 1977
(SALT TWO - 1321)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF AUGUST 3, 1977:

QUOTE:

SEMENOV STATEMENT, AUGUST 3, 1977

I

THE QUESTION OF LAND-BASED MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS OCCUPIES
AN IMPORTANT PLACE AMONG THE ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS REFERRED
TO THE DELEGATIONS FOR DISCUSSION.

AS YOU KNOW, ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING UNDERSTANDINGS
BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., BOTH SIDES REGARD THE NEW
AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT AS A SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION
TO IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S., TO

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REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL
PEACE.

IT IS PRECISELY ON THIS BASIS THAT THE SOVIET SIDE
APPROACHES THE QUESTION OF LAND-BASED MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS,
CURRENTLY UNDER DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE DELEGATIONS.

II

IN THE COURSE OF THE ONGOING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THE QUESTION WAS RAISED HERE REGARDING THE FORM OF RECORDING THE UNDERSTANDINGS BEING REACHED BETWEEN THE SIDES IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IN THIS CONNECTION, I WOULD LIKE TO REAFFIRM THAT, IN THE OPINION OF THE SOVIET SIDE, THE MOST CORRECT AND ADVISABLE APPROACH WOULD BE TO RESOLVE ALL THE ISSUES RELATING TO THE SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS AND RECORD THEM IN A SINGLE DOCUMENT--AN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD THROUGH 1985. THE RATIONALE HAS BEEN PRESENTED.

AT THE SAME TIME, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSIDERATIONS EXPRESSED HERE, INCLUDING THOSE CONTAINED IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT AT THE JULY 29, 1977 MEETING, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT IN ORDER TO FACILITATE REACHING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS ON THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS, AND IN THE INTERESTS OF CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRESS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET SIDE AGREES TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS TO COVER A SHORTER PERIOD OF TIME.

IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIET SIDE AGREES IN PRINCIPLE THAT SUCH AGREEMENT BE DRAWN UP IN THE FORM OF A PROTOCOL
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WHICH WOULD BE AN INTEGRAL--I REPEAT, AN INTEGRAL--PART OF THE AGREEMENT, WOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE AGREEMENT AND REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR THREE YEARS.

THE USSR DELEGATION HAS ALSO BEEN INSTRUCTED TO STATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE IS PREPARED TO INCLUDE IN THE THREE-YEAR PROTOCOL AN OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES TO REFRAIN FROM TESTING AND DEPLOYING LAND-BASED MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES FOR SUCH LAUNCHERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SUBJECT MUST BE PRECISELY MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS, AND ONLY SUCH LAUNCHERS. THIS, OF COURSE, DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY--AS MENTIONED BY THE U.S. SIDE--OF INCLUDING IN THE PROTOCOL THE OTHER QUESTIONS RECENTLY REFERRED TO THE DELEGATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION.

ASSUMPTION OF AN OBLIGATION PROVIDING FOR A BAN BOTH ON TESTING AND ON DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES FOR THEM ENSURES IMPLEMENTATION, WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNDERSTANDING BEING WORKED OUT, OF AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE AIMED AT LIMITING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH, UNDER WHICH THE BAN IN THE PROTOCOL WOULD APPLY ONLY TO DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS, WHILE TESTING OF SUCH LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES FOR THEM WOULD BE PERMITTED, WOULD IN FACT MEAN THAT INSTEAD OF CURBING THE RACE OR, AS WAS STATED HERE, "REDUCING THE MOMENTUM OF STRATEGIC FORCE DEVELOPMENTS," THERE WOULD BE A FURTHER BUILDUP OF STRATEGIC POTENTIAL, CONTRARY TO THE OBJECTIVES AND THRUST OF THE UNDERSTANDING BEING WORKED OUT.

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THE PROPOSALS TO RETAIN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BASIC DOCUMENT THE PROVISIONS REGARDING MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS, CONTAINED THEREIN AND BRACKETED WITH FOOTNOTE 2, APPEAR TO BE ENTIRELY UNNATURAL. TO INCLUDE THESE PROVISIONS ON MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS IN THE BASIC AGREEMENT, ON THE ONE HAND, AND TO BAN THEIR TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT UNDER THE PROTOCOL TO THIS AGREEMENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD INJECT AN OBVIOUSLY CONTRADICTORY ELEMENT INTO THE SYSTEM OF LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH COULD BE ADOPTED BY THE SIDES. THIS WOULD WEAKEN THE EFFECTIVENESS AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENTIRE UNDERSTANDING BEING WORKED OUT, AND, WE ARE CONVINCED, WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF EITHER SIDE. IN ESSENCE, SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD DEPRIVE THE VERY IDEA OF A PROTOCOL, WHICH, AS YOU KNOW, WAS SUGGESTED BY THE U.S. SIDE, OF ALL MEANING, AT LEAST IN THIS PORTION, SINCE THE NEED TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS IN A PROTOCOL AROSE BECAUSE, ACCORDING TO THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES, THIS QUESTION AS SUCH WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DISCUSSION IN THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS MUST NOT BE PREDETERMINED. OBVIOUSLY, THIS ALSO APPLIES TO THE OTHER PARTS OF THE PROTOCOL, WHICH MAY

BE INCLUDED THEREIN, AS FOLLOWS FROM THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
BETWEEN THE SIDES.

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IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE, THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES
THAT AGREEMENT BE REACHED ON A PROVISION ON MIBILE ICBM
LAUNCHERS FOR INCLUSION IN THE PROTOCOL, AS FOLLOWS:

"EACH PARTY UNDERTAKES NOT TO TEST OR DEPLY MOBILE
ICBM LAUNCHERS OR MISSILES FOR SUCH LAUNCHERS."

WE NOTE THAT THERE EXISTS MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN
PRINCIPLE TO THE EFFECT THAT APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS,
BOTH AS REGARDS THE FORMULATIONS WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED
IN THE PROTOCOL AND AS REGARDS APPROPRIATE EDITORIAL CHANGES
IN THE JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, COULD BE PRE-
PARED IN THE DRAFTING GROUP.

III

MR. AMBASSADOR,

THE U.S. SIDE HAS RAISED A QUESTION HERE REGARDING
THE SOVIET MOBILE LAUNCHER OF THE MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE
CALLED SS-20 IN THE U.S.

AT THE JULY 26, 1977 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION STATED
UNDER INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEM CALLED
SS-20 IN THE U.S. HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AND IS BEING DEPLOYED FOR
MEDIUM RANGE MISSIONS, TO REPLACE MISSILE SYSTEMS HAVING A
SIMILAR PURPOSE, AND THE SOVIET SIDE DOES NOT INTEND TO
CONVERT LAUNCHERS OF THIS SYSTEM INTO LAUNCHERS FOR LAUNCHING
ICBMS.

WE HAVE ALSO SHOWN THAT THESE LAUNCHERS HAVE BEEN
DEVELOPED AND TESTED SPECIALLY FOR MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES AND
IN VIEW OF THEIR TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES CANNOT BE USED FOR
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LAUNCHING ICBNS, AND CONSEQUENTLY THEY ARE NOT AND CANNOT
BE A SUBJECT OF NEGOTIATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW
AGREEMENT.

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MOREOVER, LAUNCHERS OF THE MISSILES CALLED SS-20
IN THE U.S. HAVE NOT BEEN TESTED AT THOSE TEST RANGES IN
THE USSR WHERE ICBMS ARE TESTED--NEITHER AT THE TEST RANGE
IN THE AREA OF TYURA-TAM NOR AT THE TEST RANGE IN THE AREA
OF PLESETSKAYA.

IT FOLLOWS FROM ALL THIS THAT THERE EXISTS NO ASSOCIA-
TION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN THE LAUNCHER OF THE SOVIET MEDIUM
RANGE MISSILE CALLED SS-20 IN THE U.S., AND AN INTERCONTINENTAL
BALLISTIC MISSILE. SUCH IS THE OBJECTIVE FACT, WHICH CAN
BE RELIABLY ESTABLISHED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERI-
FICATION.

THUS, THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR ASSERTIONS ABOUT SOME
SORT OF "DUAL CAPABILITIES" OF SOVIET LAUNCHERS OF THE
MEDIUM RANGE MISSILES CALLED SS-20 IN THE U.S. THERE ARE
NOT AND THERE CANNOT BE SUCH CAPABILITIES, ALL THE MORE SO
IN VIEW OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE PROPOSES
BE ASSUMED UNDER ARTICLE IV, PARA. 8.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ASSUMPTION OF A
MUTUAL OBLIGATION ON BANNING TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF
MOBILE ICBM LAUNCHERS AND MISSILES FOR THEM, IN CONJUNCTION
WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED PROPOSALS AND CLARIFICATIONS OF
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THE SOVIET SIDE, REMOVES THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE'S
TAKING SOME SORT OF MEASURES WHICH WOULD ENABLE THE U.S. TO

VERIFY THAT LAUNCHERS OF THE MISSILES CALLED SS-20 BY THE U.S. SIDE CANNOT BE USED FOR LAUNCHING ICBMS. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, SUCH A QUESTION SHOULD NOT ARISE HERE.

AS FOR THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT CONCEALMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN MISSILES AND THEIR LAUNCHERS, SHOULD SOME SORT OF QUESTIONS ARISE WITH RESPECT TO THE OBLIGATION OF THE SIDES NOT TO USE DELIBERATE CONCEALMENT MEASURES, THE SOVIE SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT IT BE AGREED TO BAN MEASURES TO CONCEAL THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN ICBMS AND THEIR LAUNCHERS DURING TESTING.

BY WAY OF A GENERAL CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE LAUNCHER OF THE SOVIET MISSILE CALLED SS-20 IN THE U.S. IS ASSOCIATED WITH A VERY SPECIFIC MISSILE--A MEDIUM RANGE MISSILE, AND ONLY AND EXCLUSIVELY WITH THAT MISSILE. IN VIEW OF THIS, LAUNCHERS OF THE MISSILES CALLED SS-20 IN THE U.S., AS IN GENERAL ALL LAND-BASED LAUNCHERS OF MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, ARE NOT SUBJECT TO BEING COUNTED WITHIN THE OVERALL MAXIMUM 2,4000 LEVEL BECAUSE THEY ARE OUTSIDE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

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